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Whether or not to hold a referendum on Brexit is a clear dividing line between parties in
the upcoming UK general election. However, Philipp Harms and Claudia Landwehr
argue that support for such a measure is often largely contingent on expected outcomes,
and so can entrench political divides. More deliberative democratic innovations might
therefore be better suited to resolving the UK’s political conflicts.
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By any account, British democracy is in deep trouble after the Brexit vote and the failure
of Parliament and two Prime Ministers to deal with its result in a way that pacifies the
deep conflicts that gave rise to it. But most other seemingly consolidated democracies,
too, are confronted with problems of political alienation, growing political inequality and
the rise of populist parties and candidates. These apparent ailments of democracy prompt
calls for democratic innovations to cure the disease. Democratic innovations, such as
deliberative assemblies, participatory budgeting or citizen consultations, can complement
or partly even replace representative institutions in some of their functions. Whereas
political scientists and theorists of democracy tend to favour deliberative innovations like
the latter, the most popular innovations with the public are forms of direct democracy.
In the UK, however, direct democracy – or more precisely, the Brexit referendum – is
precisely what caused the present crisis. Scared by the success of Nigel Farage’s UKIP and
unable to arbitrate the divisions within the Tory party, David Cameron called the
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referendum in 2016. Cameron was hoping to put an end to the debate about the UK’s
membership in the European Union and tried to use the public as a kind of umpire of last
resort, erroneously confident that the umpire would decide his way.
Despite the experiences with the 2016 referendum and its consequences, the People’s
Vote campaign as well as the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats continue to
advocate yet another referendum on the UK’s future relationship with the EU. They thus
seek to resolve the crisis with the same means that caused it. But will this work? We want
to highlight two interrelated and severe problems with the use of referendums to resolve
deep political conflicts. Both problems concern referendums in general, but have
particular relevance for the British case.
The first problem is that politicians’ motivation in calling a referendum, but also citizens’
preferences for referendums, are insufficiently understood. Referendums are typically
justified on the basis of their supposed intrinsic merits for democracy: they are viewed as
giving citizens a say on important policy decisions, allowing them to exercise their
democratic autonomy more directly, and they promise decisions with a strong public
mandate. Asked whether they would support more referendums to be held in their
country, citizens will tend to answer on the basis of an assessment of the democratic
merits of direct democracy.
As our research indicates, however, the intrinsic motives for supporting referendums are
only one part of the picture (Harms and Landwehr 2019a, 2019b). As soon as the decision
to hold a referendum is contextualised, a different set of motives comes into play. Where
the question is not whether there should be more referendums in general, but whether a
referendum should be held on a specific issue, support for it becomes contingent on its
expected outcome effects. Put somewhat bluntly, people tend to be more supportive of a
referendum if they expect a majority to share their position on an issue. In this case, the
referendum procedure may be expected to be instrumental to the achievement of one’s
own desired policy preference.
Although a general preference for referendums, which captures intrinsic motives for
supporting them, remains an important predictor for choosing a referendum as a
decision-making procedure for a specific issue, instrumental considerations thus play an
important role. What we can show for ordinary citizens is likely to apply to politicians and
office-holders, who are in the position to call a referendum, to an even stronger extent.
Placed in a context of strong interdependence, politicians are bound to act and decide
strategically and to base their procedural choices on strategic considerations.
Referendums are thus likely to be called in the expectation of an outcome that is in
keeping with a politician’s own policy preferences and strategic advantages.
At the same time, citizens’ and politicians’ estimation of the majority opinion may well be
wrong. In our sample, participants favouring anti-immigration policies (the issue under
consideration in our research) tended to assume a majority to share their position and
were accordingly supportive of a referendum on the matter. The support for their own
position, however, was much weaker than they assumed – psychologists call this
phenomenon the ‘false consensus effect’. The significance of instrumental, rather than
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intrinsic, motives for supporting referendums and the fact that support is contingent on
potentially faulty assumptions about congruence between own and majority preferences
leads to a further problem.
This second problem consists in the fact that where referendums are called and supported
under wrong assumptions about the majority position, their results are unlikely to be
accepted as legitimate and decisions based on them may not be expected to resolve
political conflicts. A referendum cannot replace participatory, informed and deliberative
decision-making processes, but constitutes what Cristina Lafont calls a ‘procedural
shortcut’ that will ultimately miss the goal of a democratically legitimate and broadly
accepted decision. The Brexit vote is in fact a prime example for a case in which a decision
that was based on such a shortcut rather than on inclusive and informed deliberation has
failed to settle a political conflict. Instead, the referendum has not only deepened divides,
but has also caused severe damage to the representative institutions that are to
implement its result.  
Although it remains to be seen whether or not another public vote on EU membership will
ever be held, the December election is widely viewed as a quasi-referendum on the terms
and conditions of Brexit. Given the first-past-the-post electoral system with its incentives
for strategic voting and resulting disproportional representation, however, things are
unlikely to improve whatever the result will be. Instead, trust in democratic institutions
and procedures is likely to be further diminished. 
Under these conditions, many have called for a deliberative citizens’ assembly to address
the issues Parliament has failed to resolve. Given the growing frustration with
representative institutions and alienation from politics, however, deliberation should not
stop at the Brexit question. Instead, it could take the Irish Constitutional Convention as a
model and address democratic decision-making procedures and their innovation as such,
aiming to renew the procedural consensus that enables democracies to deal with deep,
substantial conflicts peacefully and constructively.
This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of Democratic Audit.  It
draws on the authors’ article, ‘Preferences for Referenda: Intrinsic or Instrumental?
Evidence from a Survey Experiment’, published in Political Studies.
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